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Social engineering attacks in the form of phishing emails represent one of the biggest
risks to cybersecurity. There is a lack of research on how the common elements of
phishing emails, such as the presence of misspellings and the use of urgency and
threatening language, influences how the email is processed and judged by individuals.
Eye tracking technology may provide insight into this. In this exploratory study a sample
of 22 participants viewed a series of emails with or without indicators associated with
phishing emails, whilst their eye movements were recorded using a SMI RED 500 eye-
tracker. Participants were also asked to give a numerical rating of how trustworthy they
deemed each email to be. Overall, it was found that participants looked more frequently
at the indicators associated with phishing than would be expected by chance but spent
less overall time viewing these elements than would be expected by chance. The emails
that included indicators associated with phishing were rated as less trustworthy on
average, with the presence of misspellings or threatening language being associated
with the lowest trustworthiness ratings. In addition, it was noted that phishing indicators
relating to threatening language or urgency were viewed before misspellings. However,
there was no significant interaction between the trustworthiness ratings of the emails
and the amount of scanning time for phishing indicators within the emails. These
results suggest that there is a complex relationship between the presence of indicators
associated with phishing within an email and how trustworthy that email is judged to
be. This study also demonstrates that eye tracking technology is a feasible method with
which to identify and record how phishing emails are processed visually by individuals,
which may contribute toward the design of future mitigation approaches.
Keywords: phishing, eye tracking, social engineering, cybersecurity, email
INTRODUCTION
Internet browsers, email systems and other socio-technical systems require input from individual
users. Such systems may be designed in a way that aims to protect users and organizations from
external attackers as much as is possible (Das et al., 2020). How successful they are in doing so
is highly reliant on the user (Pfeffel et al., 2019). The user may not fully attend to the cues and
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prompts that the system provides them with to encourage
them to use the system in a safe way (Miyamoto et al., 2015).
Similarly, users may fail to detect and respond to potential
threats, even if the system provides prominent indicators of
these threats (Miyamoto et al., 2015). An example of this is
phishing websites, links to which are sent to potential victims
through phishing emails. Phishing emails are one form of social
engineering, which refers to the use of manipulation and trickery
to cause an individual to gain sensitive information or access
to a system (Hadnagy, 2018). This type of attack has been
described as the single biggest threat to cybersecurity (Salahdine
and Kaabouch, 2019). Individuals who engage in cyber-crime
do not need to possess programming or technological skills in
order to be able to create phishing emails; software packages that
can be used to create phishing emails can be downloaded online
(McCalley et al., 2011).
This reliance on user engagement in many sociotechnical
systems is potentially problematic. As is well established in
psychological research people often do not fully processes all
the information that is available to them in any given situation
(Gigerenzer and Brighton, 2009). That is, people are not always
rationale decision makers. Instead they make use of decision-
making heuristics, a form of a mental shortcut, to come to a
quick decision based on a limited number of cues. This is known
as the cognitive miser approach and contrasts with the naïve
scientist approach in which individuals make decisions based on a
more comprehensive and thorough evaluation of the information
available (Fiske and Taylor, 2013). It has been argued that people
are motivated tacticians, in which whether they apply a cognitive
miser or naïve scientist approach is in part determined by the
urgency, perceived importance and complexity of the situation
(Kruglanski, 1996). This strategy reflects limitations in how much
information individuals can process at any one time. If we were
to attempt to fully process all the information that is available in
every situation, we encounter each day, as in the naïve scientist
approach, then this would become extremely time consuming
(Sweller, 1988). On the other hand, using the cognitive miser
approach may be quicker and less cognitively demanding, but is
at greater risk of error, as the individual is basing their decision
on a limited number of factors. As such individuals switch
between strategies based on which they think will be the most
optimal for the situation they are facing, an approach which
will not always necessarily be correct (Gigerenzer and Brighton,
2009). The tactics used by social engineers are often based on
exploiting heuristics, by including elements that encourage the
target to engage the cognitive miser approach and make quick,
less analytical decisions (Hadnagy, 2018). Examples of this within
the social engineering technique of phishing emails can include
the use of language that contains emotive elements such as threat,
urgency, or financial information (Hadnagy, 2018). However,
research connecting information processing to the characteristics
of phishing emails is lacking. To fully understand how an
individual engages with aspects of a socio-technical system such
as phishing emails it is necessary therefore to explore how much
and what information they are processing.
One way in which this can be achieved is through eye
trackers. Eye tracking technologies are used to measure an
individual’s eye movements and in turn to determine what they
are looking at. This is known as the point of regard and is an
indication of where the individual’s attention lies. By measuring
several factors such as duration of fixations (when the eyes
are relatively stationary), the length of saccades (when the eyes
move between areas of interest), number of regressions (where
the eyes return to a previously fixated point) inferences can
be made about much cognitive processing the individual is
giving to any part of the stimulus. This information can be
combined to explore the scanpath. This refers to the sequence
of fixations and eye movements over an image. For example,
an eye tracker may be used to determine the scanpath of an
individual viewing a web page, which could provide information
about the order in which the individual views different parts
of the website. This approach has been used extensively in
Human-Computer Interaction studies, such as to assess website
usability (Cowen et al., 2002). Related technologies can also
be used to measure pupil dilation and blink rate, which can
measure cognitive overload and fatigue, respectively (Stern et al.,
1994; Hossain and Yeasin, 2014). This can be used to help
identify possible risk factors, such as if an individual may not
be fully processing information being delivered by a complex or
sensitive system.
A range of techniques have been used to record eye
movements for research since work began in the early 20th
century, including methods such as attaching electrodes to the
skin around the eye or using contact lenses with an embedded
metal coil that can be used to detect eye movements (Poole
and Ball, 2006). More recent technologies are less invasive and
often involve use of an infra-red camera to infer point-of-regard
from the reflection that is given from the cornea, which is the
outermost layer of the eye. These cameras can be placed beneath
or next to a computer monitor in a way that is unobtrusive.
Mobile eye trackers operate using the same principles but are
worn in the same manner as a pair of spectacles, which allows
for the individual to navigate their environment in a naturalistic
style (Cristina and Camilleri, 2018). In the case of cybersecurity
this could for instance involve exploring what a social engineer
pays attention to when entering the reception area of a company,
such as the location of security cameras or the presence of a PC at
the reception desk.
This technology has been used to understand user behavior
in relation to phishing websites. These are fraudulent websites
designed to appear as genuine website, such as for example an
internet banking page. Research suggests that only a quarter
of people can reliably discriminate between genuine websites
and fraudulent websites more than 75% of the time (Iuga
et al., 2016). Technological approaches such as spam filters
and machine learning may mitigate some of the risk posed
by phishing attacks, but it has been argued that technology
alone cannot completely prevent this issue (Pfeffel et al., 2019).
This highlights the need to better understand the mechanisms
behind a successful phishing attack. By using eye tracking it is
possible to explore what factors predict whether someone will
be tricked by a phishing website, by considering the interaction
between the structure of the website and what the person looks
at, or indeed fails to look at (Miyamoto et al., 2014). This has
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been used for example to understand how and if users pay
attention to web browser security indicators, such as the Firefox
Mozilla SSL certificate (Sobey et al., 2008). Research in this
areas has revealed several techniques that have been identified
in such phishing websites (Darwish and Bataineh, 2012) each
of which can be researched through the use of eye tracking
(Miyamoto et al., 2015). This includes the use of similar or
related domain names (e.g., replacing a “w” in a website address
with a “vv”), the use of high quality of animations to give
fraudulent websites a professional feel and the presentation of
fake Digital Certificates.
Further uses of eye tracking in cybersecurity have become
evident as the research field and technology have continued
to develop. For instance it has been demonstrated that the
technology can be used to change risky behaviors, such as for
example by preventing a user from continuing with use of input
forms in a website unless an eye tracker has determined that
the individual has looked at the address bar (Miyamoto et al.,
2014). Similarly, eye trackers can be used to detect anomalous
user behavior. The way in which an individual navigates a system
that they are highly familiar with will be different from someone
who is less familiar with a system: from work on expertise
in visual processing (Miyamoto et al., 2015). Eye movement
patterns are highly specialized and detectable when viewing
scenes and objects that we are experts at processing (Liversedge
et al., 2013). This difference in style will be reflected in eye
movements, and could be used as a basis for detecting illicit
behavior (Biedert et al., 2012). Recently it has been claimed
that eye tracking machines themselves may not be necessary,
and that webcams built into phones, laptops and tablets may
be sufficient (Krafka et al., 2016) for many of the purposes
discussed here. If this is the case, then it removes a major
barrier for the adoption of eye tracking related cybersecurity
measures in real life situations such as the workplace. As
has been noted any technology that is used to protect users
from cyber-attack is most effective then it is unobtrusive
(Miyamoto et al., 2015).
Whilst there has been research using eye trackers to
understand engagement with phishing website there is less
research applying this technology to phishing emails (Baki
et al., 2017), which are one vector through which targets
may be directed to a phishing website in the first instance.
There are recommendations made to the public by various
organizations around what is likely to denote something as being
a phishing email, such as the National Cyber Security Centre
advice to look for misspellings, the use of urgency and the
use of threatening language (National Cyber Security Centre,
2020), which reflects the typical features of phishing emails
identified in the literature (Pfeffel et al., 2019). There is a lack
of academic research that has explored the relationship between
these features, including how trustworthy such emails are rated
and how eye-movements may moderate this relationship. To
address this we conducted an exploratory study in which
we created phishing emails that employed characteristics and
techniques evident in phishing emails, including the presence
of misspellings in the sender address, the mention of financial
information, the use of threatening language (for example that
legal action will be taken if an email is not responded to) and
the use of urgency.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Participants
Twenty-two psychology undergraduates (90% female, age
range = 18 to 26, mean age = 20.29) were recruited from a
sample responding to an online advertisement. Participants were
awarded course credits for their participation.
Design
A within-subjects design was employed in which participants
were shown emails that either did or did not include a phishing
indicator. There were four types of phishing indicator: financial
information, urgency, misspelling, and threat. Stimuli were
presented in a random order. Eye-tracking measures used were
total dwell time, mean fixation count (denoting interest in a
particular content), number of regressions (revisits, indicating
that the item required further scrutiny because it drew attention),
mean glance duration (denoting depth of processing), entry time
and entry sequence (the time and fixation number that an area
was attended to, denoting ease of attentional capture).
Materials
Thirty-two emails were constructed based upon typical phishing
type emails. These were split between the four types of email
(misspelling, threatening, urgency, and financial) with four
variations of each email type and either containing the phishing
email indicator or not. This reflected the elements identified
in public guidance from the National Cyber Security Centre
on what may be an indicator that an email is a phishing
one (National Cyber Security Centre, 2020). These emails
were created by the researchers to be relevant to the study
sample in terms of names of local organizations and national
companies that the email purported to have been sent from.
A publicly accessible database of suspected phishing emails1 was
used to guide the creation of the study materials to ensure
that these were consistent with phishing emails currently in
circulation. The phishing emails created in this study were simple
word documents structured according to emails in Microsoft
Outlook. These contained a from line with email address, a
subject line, the main content with roughly four sentences of
text and a by-line.
Areas of interest (AOIs) were mapped onto the emails post hoc
in BeGaze. This software is used to specify the areas of an image
upon which the analysis will be based. These areas of interest were
non-overlapping and focused on the core textual information.
AOIs were: the email address, subject line, the addressee, the
instruction line, any detail (hyperlinks, tracking numbers), and
the phishing indicator (financial information, misspelling, threat,
and urgency). AOIs were invisible to participants.
Stimuli were presented on an SMI RED 500 eye-tracker
with in-built infrared cameras detecting eye movements. The
1www.phishtank.com
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FIGURE 1 | Example of email with urgency indicator.
FIGURE 2 | Example of email with financial information indicator.
FIGURE 3 | Example of email with misspelling indicator.
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FIGURE 4 | Example of email with threat indicator.
FIGURE 5 | Heat maps averaged across all participants for email with urgency indicator.
screen was a 22-inch high-resolution LCD. Eye movements were
recorded at 500 Hz with an accuracy of 0.4
◦
of visual angle
using SMI iView.
Procedure
Piloting was conducted with a sample of 8 postgraduate research
students. The purpose of this was to test the feasibility of using
the eye tracker facilities for the intended purposes of the study.
These trials involved participants using the same equipment to
view examples of phishing emails. These emails were not split
by type and participants were not asked to provide any rating of
the emails. No technological or methodological problems were
identified during this piloting phase.
Once piloting was completed the main study commenced.
After providing informed consent, participants were told that
they would be viewing a series of emails and that they
would be asked to give a rating of how trustworthy they
felt each email appeared to be. Participants’ eyes were then
calibrated to the eye tracker using the standard in-built 9-point
calibration procedure. Following calibration, the eye tracking
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FIGURE 6 | Heat maps averaged across all participants for matched email without urgency indicator.
FIGURE 7 | Heat maps averaged across all participants for email with financial information indicator.
was validated, to ensure consistent and accurate tracking.
Validation consisted of the standard SMI calibration and
validation procedure. Participants were requested to follow a
ball around to 7-pseudo random locations around the screen.
Calibration was considered successful if the eyes were calibrated
within 1
◦
of visual angle. If calibration failed, the participant
was recalibrated once, otherwise they were removed from
the analysis. The calibration was validated using the default
procedure - participants eyes fixated on the center of the
screen and if this was recording accurately, the trial proceeded.
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FIGURE 8 | Heat maps averaged across all participants for matched email without financial information indicator.
FIGURE 9 | Heat maps averaged across all participants for email with misspelling indicator.
This validation was repeated after every 13 trials. Following
this, participants began the experimental task. There were 32
identical trials.
In each trial, participants saw a blank fixation screen lasting
500 ms. Following this, participants saw the email. For each,
participants were tasked with reading the email ready to rate
it for trustability. Each email was on screen for 10 s. This
time was chosen to represent the rather short amount of
time that is devoted to reading each email that individuals
receive (Hart, 2017). After the email, participants were given
the rating screen, in which they were visually asked to rate how
trustworthy the preceding email was on an 8-point Likert-type
scale with the anchor points “Not at all trustworthy” and “Highly
trustworthy.” Participants notified the researcher verbally of their
choice, who then entered their answer into a numerical keypad.
This was done to avoid unnecessary head movements by the
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FIGURE 10 | Heat maps averaged across all participants for matched email without misspelling indicator.
FIGURE 11 | Heat maps averaged across all participants for email with threat indicator.
participant. Following completion of all trials, participants were
thanked and debriefed.
Analysis Protocol
We assessed first whether the AOI containing the phishing
indicator was scanned. To assess this, we analyzed whether
the phishing indicator AOI was scanned more than would be
expected by chance. For this, we ran a series of Bonferroni-
corrected (α = 0.0125) one-subjects t-tests (two-tailed)
comparing to a chance value for the region (which was
based on the AOI size relative to the size of the screen).
Secondly, we analyzed the amount of scanning to the other
AOIs with and without the phishing indicator. Because the
AOIs filled proportionally less of the screen in the phishing
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FIGURE 12 | Heat maps averaged across all participants for matched email without threat indicator.
indicator present conditions, we area-normalized the AOIs
by calculating the proportion of the screen that the AOIs
occupied in each screen.
Our secondary analysis concerned which type of phishing
indicator was most detectable. This was assessed with a one-
way-ANOVA on the area-normalized phishing AOIs. For all
analyses, the assumptions of parametric data were tested:
Whenever Mauchley’s test of sphericity was significant, the
Huynh-Feldt correction was applied to the degrees of freedom.
If tests of normality were violated, a non-parametric test
was used. For post hoc tests, the p-values were adjusted for
multiple comparisons.
RESULTS
Figures 1–4 show examples of emails with the four types of
phishing indicator. Figures 5–12 show a series of heat maps
indicating where participants scanned images, split into the four
pairs of emails either with or without the phishing email indicator
(financial information, misspelling, threat, and urgency). We
present an example of each category of phishing email with and
without the phishing content for ease of understanding.
Our analysis protocol was applied, and summary statistics
for the one-sample t-tests are shown in Table 1. Specifically,
these results show that while the phishing AOIs were scanned
(denoted by fixation count) and revisited (regression count) more
frequently with more intense scanning (glance duration) than
one would expect by chance, the total duration of scanning (dwell
time) was less then would be expected by chance. In other words,
less time was spent viewing the phishing indicators even though
they required greater attentional resources paid to them.
TABLE 1 | Mean (and standard error of the mean) for total dwell time
(area-normalized ms), mean fixation count, number of regressions, and mean
glance duration (ms), with one-sample t-value (df), and significance level.
Mean t-value p-value
Financial
information
Dwell time (ms) 159 (23) −9.06 (20) <0.001
Fixation count 1.40 (0.40) 13.64 (14 ) <0.001
Regression count 0.22 (0.09) 2.51 (14) =0.025
Glance Duration (ms) 93 (12) 7.87 (19) <0.001
Misspelling Dwell time (ms) 479 (101) −3.03 (20) =0.007
Fixation count 3.31 (0.63) 5.25 (17) <0.001
Regression count 1.55 (0.44) 3.50 (17) =0.003
Glance Duration (ms) 163 (20) 8.33 (20) <0.001
Threatening
content
Dwell time (ms) 629 (50) −74.48 (20) <0.001
Fixation count 3.18 (0.90) 15.83 (19) <0.001
Regression count 1.47 (0.19) 7.79 (19) <0.001
Glance Duration (ms) 104 (37) 12.91 (20) <0.001
Urgency
content
Dwell time (ms) 709 (78) −49.68 (20) <0.001
Fixation count 3.50 (0.45) 7.72 (19) <0.001
Regression count 1.46 (0.31) 4.78 (19) <0.001
Glance Duration (ms) 104 (44) 10.94 (20) <0.001
Degrees of freedom are lower due to missing values for some participants.
Our second analysis focused on exploring whether the
presence of the phishing indicator affected the scanning of
the other content. The presence of each type of phishing
indicator did not significantly affect normalized dwell time,
F(1,20) = 0.06, MSE = 28486, p = 0.813, ηp2 < 0.01.
Figure 13 shows the mean dwell duration to each of
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FIGURE 13 | Mean dwell time to the scam item for high and low trustability emails split by indicator type.
the area-normalized AOIs for those with and without the
phishing content.
Our final analysis concerned which type of phishing indicator
would be more noticeable. Table 2 shows the means for each
eye-tracking measure. Phishing indicator type affected: total
dwell time, F(3,39) = 4.98, MSE = 800312348, p = 0.031,
ηp
2 = 0.28, fixation count, F(3,39) = 6.30, MSE = 20.29,
p = 0.014, ηp2 = 0.33, regression count, F(3,39) = 6.72,
MSE = 0.95, p = 0.003, ηp2 = 0.34, glance duration,
F(3,57) = 5.89, MSE = 68.76, p = 0.004, ηp2 = 0.24, entry
time, F(3,39) = 8.24, MSE = 0.5184111, p = 0.003, ηp2 = 0.34,
and sequence, F(3,39) = 4.72, MSE = 1.91, p = 0.024,
ηp
2 = 0.27.
Specifically, financial indicators were viewed for less time
than threat indicators (mean difference = 469, p = 0.015,
r = 0.79) and urgency indicators (mean difference = 550,
p = 0.019, r = 0.72). Further, they were viewed less frequently
with less regressions than threatening indicators (mean
differencefixationcount = 2.09, p < 0.001, r = 0.61, mean
differenceregressioncount = 1.36, p < 0.001, r = 0.97) and urgency
indicators (mean differencefixationcount = 1.92, p < 0.001,
r = 0.89, mean differenceregressioncount = 0.92, p < 0.001,
r = 0.59). Glance duration was shorter for threat indicators
than financial indicators (mean difference = 60.74, p = 0.044,
r = 0.40). Threat and urgency indicators were viewed earlier than
misspelling indicators (threat: mean differenceentrytime = 1706
p < 0.001, r = 0.56, mean differencesequence = 0.93, p < 0.001,
r = 0.33; urgency: mean differenceentry time = 2855,
p < 0.001, r = 0.74 and mean differencesequence = 1.33,
p = 0.011, r = 0.52).
TABLE 2 | Mean (and standard error of the mean) for total dwell time
(area-normalized ms), mean fixation count, number of regressions, mean glance
duration (ms), entry time (ms), and sequence.
Financial
phishing
indicator
Misspelling
phishing
indicator
Threatening
phishing
indicator
Urgency
phishing
indicator
Total dwell time (ms) 159 (23) 479 (101) 630 (50) 709 (78)
Fixation count 1.43 (0.11) 2.59 (0.44) 3.35 (0.15) 3.52 (0.51)
regressions count 0.24 (0.09) 0.92 (0.24) 1.60 (0.23) 1.22 (0.24)
Glance duration (ms) 93 (12) 165 (20) 104 (9) 105 (10)
Entry time (ms) 3712 (529) 4882 (1474) 1603 (241) 1395 (247)
Sequence 3.52 (0.28) 3.23 (0.36) 4.16 (0.34) 4.56 (0.21)
A further set of analyses were run on the trustability
ratings, shown in Figure 14. These were subjected to a 2 × 4
within-subjects ANOVA. This revealed a main effect of phishing
indicator, F(3,60) = 25.63, MSE = 1.50, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.58.
Emails with misspelling and threatening phishing indicators were
rated as less trustworthy than financial (mean difference = 2.02,
p < 0.001, r = 0.76, mean difference = 1.75, p < 0.001,
r = 0.70) and urgency (mean difference = 1.44, p < 0.001,
r = 0.62, mean difference = 1.16, p = 0.002, r = 0.53) scams.
There was also a main effect of presence of phishing indicator,
F(1,20) = 10.87, MSE = 0.74, p = 0.004, ηp2 = 0.35, in which
phishing indicators present emails (5.27, SE = 0.21) were rated
as less trustworthy than emails without phishing indicators (4.83,
SE = 0.16). However, these effects interacted, F(3,60) = 9.45,
MSE = 0.97, p < 0.001, ηp2 = 0.32. The interaction was
revealed by the effect of phishing indicator presence only being
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FIGURE 14 | Mean trustability ratings for each phishing indicator.
FIGURE 15 | Mean area-normalized total dwell time split by indicator presence and absence.
significant for the misspelling scam, t(20) = 4.05, p = 0.001,
r = 0.50, and not for the other types of scams (smallest
p = 0.397).
Finally, we assessed whether the trustability rating influenced
the amount of scanning to the phishing indicators of the emails.
We used two protocols to assess this. In the first we ran a series
of correlations between the dwell time for each email type and
the trustability rating given. None of these correlations were
significant: financial phishing indicators, r(19) = 0.20, p = 0.385;
misspelling, r(19) = −0.41, p = 0.063; threat, r(19) = 0.10,
p = 0.659; and urgency, r(19) = −0.26, p = 0.263. In the second,
we analyzed whether dwell time to the phishing indicator item
was different for emails rated as trustable (scoring higher than
4) compared to those rated as untrustable (rated 4 or lower)
split by type of phishing indicator, shown in Figure 15. This
analysis was done by-item. The resulting 4 × 2 mixed ANOVA
showed no significant effect of trustability, F(1,12) = 0.06,
MSE = 45904, p = 0.811, ηp2 = 0.01, nor an interaction
with phishing indicator type, F(1,12) = 1.68 MSE = 45904,
p = 0.223, ηp2 = 0.30.
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DISCUSSION
The results of the study were notable in several ways. Participants
spent less time overall looking at indicators of phishing than they
would be expected to by chance. In addition, the presence of
phishing indicators did not significantly impact on how much
time is spent looking at the rest of the email. Overall, this
may suggest that individuals require little processing time to
recognize elements that relate to phishing. The phishing variants
of each email were also rated as being less trustworthy than the
non-phishing variants, suggesting that participants have some
ability to recognize that the selected features are associated
with fraudulent emails. Yet there was no statistically significant
association between the trustworthiness rating and the total
scanning time for the phishing indicators within the emails.
As such whilst emails with phishing indicators were rated as
less trustworthy than those without, this does not appear to
be explained by how much time is spent attending to those
phishing indicators. This makes it unclear whether the features
of phishing emails that would appear to be designed to capture
attention, exploit heuristics and invoke a cognitive miser style of
processing are achieving this. An interpretation of this could be
that the relationship between the presence of features related to
phishing emails and how trustworthy that email is seen to be is
more complex than expected. Similar unexpected, complex and
inconsistent results have been found in relation to susceptibility
to phishing emails and other factors including personality,
knowledge of computers and gender (Kleitman et al., 2018).
Other aspects of the results were more in keeping with
previous research. For instance, it was noted that participants
would tend to look first at phishing indicators relating to
urgency and threats before looking at misspellings and financial
information. This could be a reflection of survival information
bias (Nairne, 2010), in which individuals place priority on
processing information that may relates to their well-being.
Emails containing misspelling were also rated as being less
trustworthy than the other emails, which may be due to
the presence of misspelling being a more categorical factor
than the use of urgency or threatening language, which are
open to interpretation. Financial phishing email indicators
were associated with the least frequent number of fixations
and the least amount of overall dwell time, as compared
to the phishing indicators in the misspelling, urgency, and
threat email variations. Emails with financial phishing indicators
were also rated as being more trustworthy than emails with
misspelling or threat phishing indicators. This suggests that the
inclusion of financial information within phishing emails has
a lower impact of how that email is processed and to what
degree it is trusted.
There were limitations to this study. A relatively small sample
size was used, although this is not atypical when compared
to other eye-tracking studies (Tecce et al., 1998; Libben and
Titone, 2009; Choi et al., 2017). While the sample size was
consistent with previous eye-tracking research, it is not sufficient
to explore individual variability in how well eye movements
predict ability to spot phishing emails. Further recruitment of
participants was not possible due to constraints caused by the
COVID-19 situation.
The participants consisted of a narrow demographic from a
single geographical location. The sample was also predominantly
female. There is no evidence of gender differences in eye
movements (Klein and Ettinger, 2019) and a lack of consistent
research on the role of gender in phishing email susceptibility
(Kleitman et al., 2018). Nevertheless, having a more diverse
sample may help identify if there are certain types of phishing
email that are more impactful on different demographic groups.
Due to the limited research in this area there was also a
lack of baseline evidence to use to inform the creation of
phishing email materials. Examples of phishing emails available
on websites such as www.phishtank.com are not ideally suited
to experimental designs, as they often include conflation of
different phishing techniques, such as a combination of threat
and urgency. We opted to create our own stimuli in this study to
reduce the influence of such possible confounders, however, it is
difficult to do so completely whilst keeping the stimuli realistic.
Further refinement of these stimuli may also help clarify the
relationship between content and how phishing emails are read
and judged. Finally, we note that asking participants to provide a
trustworthiness rating of the stimuli may have alerted them that
the study related to phishing emails. As demonstrated by Parsons
et al. (2015) participants may be more successful at identifying
phishing emails when they are aware in advance that they may
be about to do so.
The results of this study demonstrate some important points.
It provides evidence that eye tracking technology can be used
to determine whether people look at the common indicators
of phishing emails, and also inform us on the order in which
these are attended to. In doing so it also demonstrated some
unexpected patterns, including that individuals look at phishing
indicators more frequently than would be expected by chance but,
counterintuitively, spend less overall time doing so than would
be expected by chance. Building upon this research may provide
more avenues for the understanding and mitigation of the serious
threat that phishing emails pose to cybersecurity.
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